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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT REJECTS
THE PLAINTIFF VIEWPOINT RULE-
McCARTY V. AMOCO PIPELINE COMPANY
To secure federal jurisdiction under diversity of citizenship, ' section 1332
of the Judicial Code requires a showing that the value of the matter in con-
troversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 2 In suits for
liquidated damages, the sum claimed in good faith by a plaintiff will gener-
ally equal a defendant's potential liability. 3 In suits for injunctive or de-
claratory relief, however, the opposing parties may view the particular mat-
ter in controversy from widely differing financial perspectives. The pecuniary
value of the right a plaintiff seeks to enforce by an injunction may not equal
1. The constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction is set forth in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. I, which provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend ...to Controversies ...between
Citizens of different States. ... This jurisdiction was given to the federal courts by the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides that:
[Tjhe circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the
matter in dispute exceeds exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dol-
lars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the
suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of
another State.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73.
The requirement that one of the parties be a citizen of the forum state was removed by the
Judiciary Act of 1875, which provided that jurisdiction be granted over "a controversy between
citizens of dilferent states" if the jurisdictional amount requirement is met. Act of March 3,
1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) provides, in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and citizens or subjects of a foreign State; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign State
are additional parties ...
(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a corporation shall
be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State
where it has its principal place of business ...
The amount originally fixed by the Judiciary Act of 1789 was $500. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch.
20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. This figure was raised to $2,000 by Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24
Stat. 552, and to $3,000 by Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087. The last
increase, to $10,000, was made by Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415.
3. 1 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.91 [1], at 839 (2d ed. 1979); Comment, The Juris-
dictional Amount in Controversy in Suits to Enforce Federal Rights, 54 TEX. L. REv. 545, 552
(1976). The defendant may be liable for additional court costs in excess of the sum claimed by a
plaintiff, but these sums are not considered in determining the amount in controversy. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
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the expenses a defendant would bear as a consequence of a decision in favor
of the plaintiff. In these cases, the determination of the value of the matter
in controversy will depend upon which of the two litigants' financial perspec-
tives or "views" is considered controlling by a court. 4
The majority of federal courts use the "plaintiff viewpoint rule" to deter-
mine the value of the matter in controversy. 5 In some cases, however, the
monetary value of the legal right asserted by a plaintiff is less than the
$10,000 minimum. Nonetheless, it commonly occurs that in the same case a
defendant could be compelled by a court to bear a substantial financial bur-
den, by removing or altering an interfering object or modifying some activ-
ity. A court that adheres to the plaintiff viewpoint rule in this situation
would be forced to deny the jurisdiction of the federal courts, even though
the defendant's stake in the outcome of the case far exceeds the $10,000
minimum requirement.
Recently, in McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Company,6 the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit faced a similar situation. In this case, the plaintiffs
sought an injunction ordering the defendant to remove its $35,000 pipeline
from their property. While the plaintiffs contended that their financial in-
terest in the case was less than $10,000, 7 it was clear that removing the
pipeline would result in the loss of the defendant's $35,000 investment. 8
The court of appeals, rejecting the plaintiff viewpoint rule, adopted instead
the "either viewpoint rule," thus enabling the court to consider both the
plaintiff's view and the defendant's view. 9 The court then held that because
the cost to the defendant of removing the pipeline would exceed the $10,000
minimum, the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over the case. 'o
The McCarty decision is significant in two respects. First, the court of
appeals correctly recognized the inadequacy of the plaintiff viewpoint rule.
By adopting the either viewpoint rule, the various federal courts within the
Seventh Circuit will be guided by a policy of logically applying the require-
ment of the jurisdictional amount statute and thus will avoid the unfair re-
4. To avoid confusion, the plaintiff's or defendant's financial perspectives toward the litiga-
tion are referred to as the plaintiff's view or defendant's view. The plaintiff viewpoint rule is a
test under which a court considers only the plaintiff's view. Under the either viewpoint rule, a
court may look to either the plaintiff's view or the defendant's view.
5. See note 18 and accompanying text infra.
6. 595 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1979).
7. Id. at 391.
8. The defendant filed an affidavit with the court of appeals, which stated, in pertinent
part:
4. Plaintiffs have asked that Amoco be enjoined from using the easement strip
across their land, and that it be ordered to remove its pipeline from such land. If
such relief were granted the loss to Amoco would be the cost of constructing the
pipeline at an estimated cost of $35,000. These actual damages would be exclusive
of the cost of relocating the pipeline to an alternate easement strip.
Brief for Appellee at 6, McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1979).
9. 595 F.2d at 395.
10. Id.
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sults that often arise from strict adherence to the more inflexible rule.
Moreover, the McCarty court analyzed these procedural rules within a his-
torical context, and thus dispelled some of the confusion that surrounds this
area of civil procedure.
The purpose of this Note is threefold. First, the historical development of
the viewpoint rules is discussed. Particular attention is directed toward the
United States Supreme Court's failure to state definitively its position on the
question of which viewpoint rule is appropriate in suits asking for nonmone-
tary remedies, Next, the McCarty decision is analyzed, and the relative
merits of the either viewpoint and plaintiff viewpoint rules are discussed.
It is shown that considerations of fairness and logic warrant the utiliza-
tion of the either viewpoint rule. Finally, the impact of the rule is examined,
and certain limitations on the application of the rule are presented. The
Note argues that the rule neither substantially alters a court's procedure for
determining jurisdiction nor significantly increases the federal court case
load.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Under section 1332 of the Judicial Code, the matter in controversy in suits
involving diversity jurisdiction must exceed the sum or value of $10,000. 11
Despite the apparent simplicity of this statutory language, the provision
poses an analytical problem for the courts in suits for non-monetary rem-
edies. Unlike suits for dollar damages, a claim for injunctive relief does not
lend itself to precise valuation. 12 The seminal case in this area is Missis-
sippi & Missouri Railroad v. Ward, 13 which involved a suit to abate a
bridge as a nuisance. The United States Supreme Court held that although a
sufficient amount of damage had not been sustained by the plaintiff, jurisdic-
tion would not be denied because "the removal of the obstruction is the
matter of controversy ...and the value of the object must govern."' 14 Un-
fortunately, the Court failed to specify which value and to what "object" it
11. See note 2 supra.
12. See, e.g., Elliot v. Empire Natural Gas Co., 4 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1925). The court
stated: "No rules as to how jurisdictional amount shall be arrived at can be laid down governing
every case, for there are different shades of fact differentiating the various cases, and each one
is dependent upon its own particular facts and circumstances." Id. at 496. For general discus-
sions of the various rules employed by the federal courts in valuating the jurisdictional amount
in suits for injunctive relief, see Ilsen & Sardell, The Monetary Minimum in Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 183 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Ilsen & Sardell]; Com-
ment, Federal Courts: Jurisdictional Amount in Injunction Suits in Federal District Courts, 25
CAL. L. REv. 336 (1937); Comment, Federal Jurisdictional Amount: Determination of the Matter
in Controversy, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1369 (1960); Comment, Federal Jurisdictional Amount Re-
quirement in Injunction Suits, 49 YALE L.J. 274 (1939); Note, Jurisdictional Amount in the
Federal District Courts, 4 VAND. L. REv. 146 (1950).
13. 67 U.S. 485 (1862).
14. Id. at 492.
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was referring in its determination of jurisdictional amount. 15 The costs of
removing the obstruction or object, which the defendant would bear, may
have been the value in question. 16 On the other hand, the Court may have
been referring to the plaintiff's objective of sailing free from the interference
of the bridge. 17 The Court's decision is extremely confusing and to date the
problem remains unsolved.
Consequently, various federal courts have developed their own procedures
for determining the value of the matter in controversy in suits for injunctive
relief. From this body of case law, four viewpoint rules have emerged: the
plaintiff viewpoint rule, the defendant viewpoint rule, the either viewpoint
rule, and the invoking party rule. The majority of federal courts utilize the
plaintiff viewpoint rule, and in determining whether the jurisdictional
amount requirement is satisfied, these courts look only at the benefit the
plaintiff stands to gain by the lawsuit. 18
15. McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1979).
16. If this was the Court's rationale, then the Court utilized the defendant's view. This
opinion is asserted in Comment, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Aftermath of Snyder v.
Harris, 68 Nw. L. REV. 1011, 1017 (1974). For a general discussion of Ward, see Kennedy,
Valuing Federal Matters in Controversy: Hohlfeldian Analysis in Symbolic Logic, 35 TENN. L.
REV. 423 (1968).
17. This language has recurred in subsequent Supreme Court cases. In Packard v. Banton,
264 U.S. 140 (1924), the Court cited Ward to support the proposition that "[tihe object of the
suit is to enjoin the enforcement of the statute, and it is the value of this object thus sought to
be gained that determines the amount in dispute." Id. at 142. More recently, in Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), the Court stated: "In actions
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in controversy is
measured by the value of the object of the litigation . I... d at 347. What must be under-
stood here is that the Court has not conclusively established the exclusivity of the plaintiff
viewpoint rule because in both cases, jurisdiction was upheld. See note 21 infra. The either
viewpoint rule contains the plaintiff's view as a component, as well as the defendant's view.
Thus, these cases do not necessarily preclude the adoption of the either viewpoint rule.
The Ward case may be explicable in that the Court erroneously considered the bridge to be a
public nuisance. Thus, although the plaintiffs had not suffered damage in excess of the jurisdic-
tional amount, the Court may have been considering the public's right to free navigation, an
amount which would certainly exceed the statutory minimum. The Court stated: "The private
party sues rather as a public prosecutor than on his own account . . . and acts in behalf of all
others, who are or may be injured." Mississippi & Missouri R. R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 492
(1862). See 1 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.96[2], at 919 (2d ed. 1979).
18. See, e.g., Massachusetts State Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Federal Prescription Serv., 431
F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1970) (in diversity class action suits, the plaintiff viewpoint rule is the only
valid rule); Seaboard Fin. Co. v. Martin, 244 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1957) (jurisdictional amount in a
suit to enjoin the use of a similar corporate name is the value of the plaintiff's claimed rights);
John B. Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Nay. Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779
(1945) (amount in a suit to enjoin the discharge of an employee must be found in the monetary
loss plaintiff suffered as a result of the discharge); Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch,
116 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1940) (amount in a suit to restrain bondholders from suing is determined
from the plaintiff's view); Pinkston v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 69 F.2d 600 (6th
Cir.), aff'd, 293 U.S. 96 (1934) (amount in a suit to enjoin association from discontinuing pay-
ments was determined by the value of the plaintiff's rights, not the total pension fund). In
addition to these representative cases, the numerous decisions of the lower federal courts sup-
porting, although not expressly, the plaintiff viewpoint rule are assembled chronologically in
Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 602, 649-50 (1952).
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The plaintiff viewpoint rule is derived from the fact that in most cases a
plaintiff brings the case to federal court, sets forth the claim for relief, and
bears the burden of proving jurisdictional facts. 19 The Supreme Court has
stated that the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls the determination of
jurisdictional amount in suits for monetary damages. 20 Although this estab-
lishes the rule in damage suits, 2 1 there are no Supreme Court decisions
squarely endorsing the plaintiff viewpoint rule in suits for injunctive relief. 22
The decision most frequently cited in support of the plaintiff viewpoint
rule in suits for injunctive relief is Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual
Light, Heat & Power Co. 23 In that case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
defendant power company from constructing poles and wires that interfered
with the plaintiff's business. The trial court, employing the defendant view-
point rule, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdictional amount noting that
the expense to the defendant of removing the poles did not exceed the
statutory minimum. 24 The United States Supreme Court reversed, and re-
jected the defendant viewpoint rule. 25 The Court noted that the plaintiff's
right to operate its plant free of the interference of the defendant's poles had
a value in excess of the jurisdictional requirement. As a result, the Court
19. Kheel v. Port of New York Auth., 457 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983
(1972). In Kheel, the court stated that because the plaintiff must prove jurisdictional facts, the
amount in controversy must be calculated by the plaintiff viewpoint rule. See also Dobie, Juris-
dictional Amount in the United States District Court, 38 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1925) [hereinafter
cited as Dobie]; Ilsen & Sardell, supra note 12, at 183.
20. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938). The Court stated
that "[tihe rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court
is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the
claim is apparently made in good faith." Id. at 288.
21. The plaintiff viewpoint rule is, however, of little importance in suits for monetary relief
because the sum claimed by the plaintiff will equal the defendant's potential liability. See, e.g.,
Inman v. Milwhite.Co., 261 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Ark. 1966). The court stated that problems do
"not ordinarily arise in suits for money judgments because in such cases the plaintiff's gain is
usually the defendant's loss." Id. at 707.
22. 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §
3703, at 407 (1976):
Neither Dean Dobie nor those who have accepted his view have pointed to any
Supreme Court decision rejecting jurisdiction when the jurisdictional amount was
satisfied from the defendant's viewpoint, but not from the plaintiff's. Only a case of
this character can conclusively establish the exclusivity of the plaintiff viewpoint
rule.
23. 239 U.S. 121 (1915). Accord, McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d at 392.
24. 239 U.S. at 125.
25. Id. at 126. The Court stated:
The district court erred in testing the jurisdiction by the amount that it would cost
defendant to remove its poles and wires where they conflict or interfere with those
of the complainant, and replacing them in such a position as to avoid the interfer-
ence. Complainant sets up a right to maintain and operate its plant and conduct its
business free from wrongful interference by defendant. This right is alleged to be of
a value in excess of the jurisdictional amount, and at the hearing no question seems
to have been made but that it has such value.
1980] McCARTY
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held that it was incorrect for the trial court to ignore the plaintiff's view
when calculating whether the requisite jurisdictional amount was present. 26
Contrary to what some courts and commentators have assumed, the
Glenwood Court did not adopt unequivocally the plaintiff viewpoint rule. 27
The holding in Glenwood stated only that a federal court could not deny
jurisdiction when the requisite amount in controversy was present from the
viewpoint of a plaintiff. There is nothing in this case that precludes the pos-
sibility that a defendant's view may be considered as a means to securing
jurisdiction. A Supreme Court case rejecting jurisdiction where the jurisdic-
tional amount is satisfied from the defendant's view, but not the plaintiff's,
would conclusively establish the plaintiff viewpoint rule. The Court has not,
up to now, so ruled.2 8
The rule that enables a court to consider either the plaintiff's or defend-
ant's views is .the either viewpoint rule. This rule has been adopted by a
minority of courts, and is the most liberal of the viewpoint rules. 29 The
rule may be applied regardless of whether the case is brought originally by
the plaintiff in, or removed by the defendant to, federal court. 30  Some Su-
preme Court support for the either viewpoint rule can be found in Smith v.
Adams, 31 a case involving a disputed legislative election. The Court denied
jurisdiction, ruling that the plaintiff had failed to establish any relationship
26. id.
27. Contra, Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Sandvick Steel, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Dobie, supra note 19,
at 734; llsen & Sardell, supra note 12, at 183.
28. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS:
RULES EDITION 112-13 n.54.2 (1960 & Supp. 1975). See note 22 supra.
There is one clear holding from the lower courts in which the plaintiff viewpoint rule was
chosen, and the either viewpoint rule rejected. In Zep Mfg. Corp. v. Haber, 202 F. Supp. 847
(D. Tex. 1962), the plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendant from violating a convenant not to
compete. The court recognized that the defendant stood to lose $33,000 if the injunction were
granted, while the plaintiff would gain only $3300 if it were successful. The court applied the
plaintiff viewpoint rule, holding that $10,000 was not in controversy, and thus denied federal
jurisdiction.
29. See, e.g., Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 605 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir.
1979) (jurisdictional amount in a suit to restrain violations of Unfair Sales Act is established by
the defendant's costs in complying with the Act); Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir.
1976) (amount may be established in a suit to declare a statute unconstitutional by the extent of
the claimed pecuniary burden on the defendants if the plaintiffs were to prevail); Committee for
G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (amount may be established by the cost
to the defendant of a court order declaring a drug abuse program unconstitutional); Ridder Bros.
Inc. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944) (in a suit for specific performance of a contract,
jurisdictional amount was established by the effect part of the relief prayed for would have on
the defendant). Additional cases from the lower courts are arranged chronologically in Annot.,
30 A.L.R.2d 602, 649-50 (1952).
30. This feature distinguishes the either viewpoint rule from the invoking party rule. The
latter rule provides for the consideration of the defendant's view, but only upon removal to
federal court. This becomes problematical because it contradicts the requirements of section
1441 of the Judicial Code. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text infra.
31. 130 U.S. 167 (1889).
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between the election and some financial result that would form the basis for
determining the jurisdictional amount. 32 Nevertheless, the Court stated in
dicta that, as a general rule, a test for determining the value of the matter in
controversy could be "the pecuniary result to one of the parties immediately
from the judgment." 33  A number of federal courts have parroted this lan-
guage when adopting the either viewpoint rule. 34 ,
A recent Supreme Court case indicates that the Court has yet to enunciate
clearly its position on the various viewpoint rules. In Illinois v. City of Mil-
waukee, 35 the Court held that a suit against four Wisconsin cities for water
pollution would be most appropriately instituted at the district court level.
Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that considerable in-
terests in the purity of interstate waters seemed to put any question of juris-
dictional amount beyond doubt.3 6  He then cited three cases in support:
Glenwood, 3  a case generally regarded, though incorrectly, as establishing
the plaintiff viewpoint rule; Mississippi & Missouri Railroad v. Ward;38 and
Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., a case from the Tenth Circuit expressly
adopting the either viewpoint rule.39 Perhaps the Illinois Court was recog-
32. Id. at 176.
33. Id. at 175. See Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879). The Market Co. plaintiff
sued with 205 other renters of market-place stalls to prevent the defendant from selling the
structure to another buyer. The Supreme Court established jurisdictional amount by consider-
ing the detriment to the defendant company, stating that the pleadings indicated that "the sale
which the company proposed to make, and the court below enjoined, would have realized to
the company more than $60,000. Of this benefit the decree deprives them. It is very plain,
therefore, that the appeal is one within our jurisdiction." Id. at 113-14.
34. See, e.g., Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 408
U.S. 1 (1972) (jurisdiction may be determined by the loss to the defendant as well as the gain
plaintiff may seek); Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940) (the test
for jurisdictional amount is the pecuniary result to either party that the judgment would pro-
duce); Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973) (jurisdictional amount in suit by
four senators challenging defendant's right to administer $790 million fund may be satisfied by
the result to either party).
See generally Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 394 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975); National
Ass'n for Community Dev. v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973); Miller v. Standard
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Mich. 1972); State Chartered Banks v. Peoples
Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Inman v. Milwhite Co., 261 F. Supp. 703
(E.D. Ark. 1966); Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 226 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Va. 1964);
Trail v. Green, 206 F. Supp. 896 ( D.N.J. 1962) (dictum); Sterl v. Sears, 88 F. Supp. 431 (N.D.
Tex. 1950).
35. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
36. Id. at 93.
37. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121 (1915).
See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
38. 67 U.S. 485 (1862).
39. 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940). In Ronzio, the plaintiff sued to quiet title to certain water
rights. The parties stipulated that the value to the plaintiff of the right to use the water was no
more than $2,000, and the value to the defendant was of an amount exceeding the jurisdictional
minimum amount. The court held that the either viewpoint rule was applicable, and utilized
the defendant's; view to satisfy the amount requirement. Id. at 606.
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nizing the validity of all the tests. In any event, the matter is not, as some
courts have assumed, "well-settled" by the United States Supreme Court.
40
The fourth and final rule, utilized by a distinct minority of the federal
courts, is the "invoking party" rule. 41 Under this test, the party who in-
vokes federal jurisdiction possesses the controlling viewpoint for purposes of
determining the amount in controversy. Thus, if a plaintiff files suit origi-
nally, the court will look only to the plaintiff's view. Conversely, if a defend-
ant removes a case to federal court, only the defendant's view will be
examined.
In certain situations, however, the invoking party rule operates in a man-
ner contrary to the provisions of the removal statute. 42 Under section 1441
of the Judicial Code, a case may be removed to a federal court only if a
federal court could also exercise original jurisdiction over the case. 43 Under
the invoking party rule, a plaintiff might be denied jurisdiction over his orig-
inal suit because, from the plaintiff's view, the statutory amount require-
ment is not satisfied. On the other hand, the same case, after being insti-
tuted at the state court level, could be heard upon removal if, from the
defendant's view, the requirement is satisfied. Thus, because it leads to re-
sults contrary to the requirements of section 1441, the invoking party rule is
impracticable. .4
Before McCarty, three different viewpoint rules had been employed at
the district court level of the Seventh Circuit. Although most of the recent
cases supported the plaintiff viewpoint rule,4 5 at least one older case expressly
40. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 117 (2d ed. 1970). See, e.g., Purcell
v. Summers, 126 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1942). The court stated that "'[i]t is well settled that the
measure of jurisdiction in a suit for injunction is the value to plaintiff of the right which he
seeks to protect." 1d. at 394.
41. See Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) (dictum); Martin v.
City Water Co. of Chillicothe, 197 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1912) (suit to enjoin defendant from charg-
ing certain metered water rates); Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enterprises Div. Consol.
Foods Corp., 369 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Ky. 1973); Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp.
792 (W.D. Ky. 1962) jurisdictional amount was established by the defendant upon removal to
federal court in a suit to enjoin the taking of photographs).
42. McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d at 393; 1 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
0.91[1], at 845-46 n.10 (2d ed. 1979).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) provides: .(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants to the
district court .. ..
44. McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d at 393; 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3793, at 410 (1976).
45. See, e.g., Miller-Bradford & Risberg, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 414 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D.
Wis. 1976) (defendant could not establish jurisdictional amount by the costs of complying with a
disputed distributorship agreement because the test is the amount the plaintiff stands to gain by
the lawsuit); Lakeside Merc, Hosp., Inc. v. Indiana State Bd. of Health, 421 F. Supp. 193
(N.D. Ind. 1975) (the value of the matter in controversy in a suit by a hospital to declare
certain expenditures eligible for federal ieimbnrsement is the value of the relief the plaintiff
1980] McCARTY
employed the either viewpoint rule. 46 Dicta from one recent case, how-
ever, expressed approval for the invoking party rule. 17 In the absence of
any unequivocal directive by the United States Supreme Court, it was
necessary f6r the court of appeals in McCarty to express its opinion in un-
ambiguous terms.
THE MCCARTY DECISION
BACKGROUND AND REASONING OF THE COURT
In 1977, the Amoco Pipeline Company obtained an uncontested condem-
nation order against certain real estate owned by Ray and Genevieve
McCarty and located in Vigo County, Indiana. 4 Amoco promptly con-
structed a pipeline across the easement at an estimated cost of $35,000. 4 9
Some months later, the state appraiser's award for the value of the con-
demned land, to which the McCartys filed exceptions, was submitted and a
trial date was set in Vigo County Superior Court. 50 The McCartys then
filed a motion requesting a reversal of the condemnation order. The state
court overruled this motion. 51
The McCartys then filed another suit in Vigo County Superior Court seek-
ing reversal of the condemnation order and an injunction ordering Amoco to
remove its pipeline. Amoco removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana and filed a motion for summary
judgment. 52 The McCartys moved to remand the case to the state court
seeks), aff'd nme., 547 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1976); State ex rel. Bruce v. Larkin, 346 F. Supp.
1065 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (in a suit to enjoin the defendant from performing abortions, jurisdiction
may not be established by the financial loss the defendant will suffer if the plaintiff is success-
ful); National Lock Co. v. Chicago Regional Labor Bd., 8 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. I11. 1934) (juris-
dictional amount in a suit to enjoin the defendant from making any findings with regard to an
employee walkout must be the value of the plaintiff's intangible rights).
46. Armstrong v. Townsend, 8 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. Ind. 1934) (suit to enjoin certain acts by
the state auditor as unconstitutional may be heard in federal court if the pecuniary result to
either party directly from the decree exceeds the jurisdictional amount).
47. Barton Chem. Corp. v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. I11. 1975).
In dicta, the court cited Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enterprises Div. Consol. Foods Corp.,
369 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (in a suit-to enjoin unfair competition, if the petition is silent
regarding monetary damages, the court may turn to the petition for removal to determine juris-
dictional amount).
48. McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., No. 5-C-77-564 (Vigo County Ct. May 26, 1977). IND.
CODE § 32-11-3-1 (1971) provides that corporations authorized to transport oil may condemn
and appropriate land for such purposes. The McCartys took no appeal from the state court's
condemnation order although such appeal is authorized by IND. CODE § 32-11-1-5 (1971).
49. See note 8 supra.
50. McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., No. 5-C-77-564 (Vigo County Ct. June 23, 1977). The
state appraiser awarded the McCartys the sum of $1,625. Under Indiana law, the filing of
exceptions nullifies the appraiser's report, and the question of damages is tried de novo before
the court or jury. Schnull v. Indianapolis Union R.R., 190 Ind. 572, 131 N.E. 51 (1921);
Halstead v. Vandalia R.R., 48 Ind. App. 96, 95 N.E. 439 (1911).
51. McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., No. 5-C-77-564 (Vigo County Ct. March 9, 1978).
52. McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., No. TH 78-64-C (S.D. Ind. June 8, 1978).
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arguing that the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement was not satis-
fied. The district court denied the motion to remand, reasoning that both
the value of the pipeline and the cost to Amoco of removing it exceeded the
$10,000 requirement. 53 Consequently, the district court granted Amoco's
motion for summary judgment, concluding that the McCartys' suit was a
collateral attack on the state court's ruling and thus was barred under the
doctrine of res judicata. 54 The McCartys appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court
properly exercised jurisdiction over the case and affirmed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment. 55 The principal issue before the court in-
volved the method of determining jurisdictional amount in controversy in a
suit for injunctive relief which had been removed from a state court. Justice
Swygert, writing for the court, first surveyed the relevant United States Su-
preme Court case law, and outlined the development of the viewpoint rules.
The McCarty court cited Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light,
Heat & Power Co. 56 as the primary Supreme Court case in support of the
plaintiff viewpoint rule.57 The court held, however, that the Glenwood case
does not preclude the possibility that the defendant's view may be consid-
ered in the determination of jurisdictional amount. 58  Moreover, the court
found Supreme Court language favorable to the either viewpoint rule in
Smith v. Adams59 and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,6 0 although neither of
these cases was directly on point. 61 Thus, the court of appeals concluded
that it was not bound by precedent to either of the rules.62 The court
briefly examined an alternative employed by a few lower courts, the invok-
ing party rule. 63 The rule was found to be desirable because it ties the
burden of proving jurisdiction to the controlling viewpoint, but the court
53. McCarty v, Amoco Pipeline Co., No. TH 78-64-C (S.D. Ind. July 13, 1978). The district
court ruled:
By its brief and supporting affidavit on the instant motion, defendant has dem-
onstrated that the cost of such removal, as well as the value to defendant of not
removing such pipeline, is well in excess of the required jurisdictional amount.
Plaintiffs have not contested defendant's assertions by any reply brief.
The principal purpose of the requirement of a minimum jurisdictional amount in
controversy is to assure that an action is substantial. The Court is satisfied that the
amount in controversy in this action is in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars, exclusive
of interest and costs.
54. McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., No. TH 78-64-C (S.D. Ind. July 13, 1978). The court
held that the action constituted a collateral attack on the state court's order and thus was barred
by the doctrine of res judicta.
55. 595 F.2d at 395.
56. 239 U.S. 121 (1915). See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
57. 595 F.2d at 392.
58. Id.
59. 130 U.S., 167 (1889). See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
60. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
61. 595 F.2d at 393.
62. Id. at 392.
63. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
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dismissed it as impracticable because in certain situations, the rule conflicts
with the requirements of the removal statute. 64
Turning to the policy considerations underlying the rules, the court noted
that the plaintiff viewpoint rule is a simple test and, as such, provides poten-
tial litigants with a more certain basis for predicting whether or not their
case can be heard in a federal forum. 65 However, the court recognized that
in some cases where a defendant stands to lose a substantial sum, adherence
to the plaintiff viewpoint rule would "blind federal courts to the realities of
the magnitude of the controversy." 66 Quoting Professor Moore exten-
sively, 67 the court stated that the purpose of the jurisdictional amount stat-
ute was primarily to measure the substantiality of a suit and, consequently,
it held that it should look to the effect of the litigation on either party to
ascertain the value of the matter in controversy. 68
The court noted that it could find no prior Seventh Circuit cases squarely
on point. 69 The court recognized, however, that in City of Milwaukee v.
Saxbe, 70 it had stated that the plaintiff viewpoint rule was preferred in civil
64. Id. at 393. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
65. Id. at 394.
66. Id.
67. See 1 J. MooRE FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.91[11, at 846 (2d ed. 1979).
68. 595 F.2d at 394.
69. The court discussed two Seventh Circuit cases that had been cited in support of the
plaintiff viewpoint rule. In Breault v. Feighenholtz, 380 F.2d 90 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1014 (1967), the plaintiff brought suit to set aside a will. The court of appeals held that the
plaintiffs had not produced sufficient proof that the action involved the requisite value in excess
of $10,000, and thus it declined to assert jurisdiction. The McCarty court noted that the Breault
court was not required to choose between viewpoints, and therefore nothing in the case pre-
cluded the adoption of the either viewpoint rule. 595 F.2d at 394-95.
In Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 404 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 988 (1969), the court of appeals rejected the defendant's assertion that the jurisdictional
amount requirement could be satisfied by the, value of her compulsory counterclaim. The court
based its ruling on the fact that the defendant had continuously resisted the plaintiff's attempts
to secure federal jurisdiction, and held that it would be unfair to allow her to choose a federal
forum in light of her previous position. The McCarty court held that the Simpson case did not
involve the viewpoint question and did not preclude the consideration of the defendant's view.
595 F.2d at 395.
70. 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976). In Saxbe, the City of Milwaukee sued the Attorney
General to investigate the hiring practices of outlying suburban communities, and initiate suits
against them on a nondiscriminatory basis. The court ultimately decided the case on different
statutory grounds, but stated in dicta:
An application of the "either party" Ronzio test would sustain jurisdiction in the
present case. Under that decision, the test for determining the amount in con-
troversy is the pecuniary result to either party which the judgment would directly
produce. We have no difficulty in concluding that a judgment requiring the Attor-
ney General to investigate the hiring and promotional practices of the outlying sub-
urban communities and of initiating, on a non-discriminatory basis, pattern and
practice suits against them would vastly exceed the jurisdictional amount. On the
other hand, measuring the amount in controversy by the value of City's right to be
free from discriminatory prosecution would, at least on the present record, likely
defeat the existence of § 1331 jurisdiction. . . . On balance, we think it preferable
to adhere to the approach which measures the amount in controversy by the value
of the right to be protected.
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rights suits against federal officers. Ruling that the statement was dicta, and
therefore not binding, the court nevertheless refrained from overruling
Saxbe, stating only that "[w]hatever the merits may be of following the
plaintiff viewpoint rule in civil rights actions against government officials, we
decline to follow the Saxbe dicta ... "71
The court then held that in this removed diversity case, the interests of
fairness and equity would best be served by applying the either viewpoint
rule. 72 Jurisdiction was properly extended over the McCarty case because
Amoco had shown, by an unchallenged affidavit, that the pecuniary result to
it from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would exceed the statutory
amount. The court then affirmed the district court's decision on the merits of
the case, holding that the grant of summary judgment was proper. 73
Id. at 702. The Saxbe court noted that other courts have generally adhered to the plaintiff
viewpoint rule, but it provided no reasoning in support of its choice.
71. In general, most civil rights suits are exempted from the jurisdictional amount require-
ment by 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976), which provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
The Supreme Court has stated, however, that suits against federal officers for deprivation of
constitutional rights are not covered by section 1343. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S.
538, 547 (1972). These cases must be brought under the federal question jurisdiction provided
by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), which provides, in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,
except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought
against the United States, any agency, thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in
his official capacity.
The either viewpoint rule has been applied in suits brought under section 1331 jurisdiction. See
Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Gomez v. Wilson, 477
F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Miller v. Standard Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp.
185 (E.D. Mich. 1972). The court stated:
Although lower courts are divided on the issue .. . the sensible rule in federal
question cases requires that if it can be determined from the complaint that "the
value of the object" involves more than $10,000, whether looked at from the view-
point of the Plaintiff or from the viewpoint of the Defendant, jurisdictional amount
is present. This should be specially true in federal question cases, for in such cases
the federal court should not strain to dismiss for want of jurisdictional amount.
Id. at 188. See also Comment, A Federal Question Question: Does Priceless Mean Worthless?,
14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 268 (1969). Thus, it is unclear from both Saxbe and McCarty precisely
what grounds exist for not applying the either viewpoint rule in civil rights suits.
72. 595 F.2d at 395.
73. Id. at 396.
CRITIQUE
The McCarty case presents a textbook example of the major deficiency of
the plaintiff viewpoint rule. 74 If the court of appeals had adhered strictly to
the rule in this case, it would have been compelled to deny jurisdiction over
a case involving at least $35,000 on the grounds that the minimum jurisdic-
tional amount of $10,000 was not present. The court avoided this result by
adopting the either viewpoint rule and thereby expanded its jurisdictional
amount test to include the defendant's view as well as the plaintiff's. The
primary value of the plaintiff viewpoint rule is that it provides a simple test
which can be easily applied by the examining court. Litigants may also ben-
efit by the rule in that they will have a more certain standard for predicting,
before coming to the courthouse, whether or not federal jurisdiction will be
secured. 75 In practice though, these considerations do not justify denying a
litigant with a sizable interest in the controversy access to the federal courts.
The McCarty court correctly emphasized the elements of fairness and com-
mon sense as the basis for applying the either viewpoint rule. 76 Strict
adherence to the plaintiff viewpoint rule sometimes forces defendants to be
subjected to state court judgments which exceed $10,000, while denying
these individuals the opportunity to litigate in a federal forum. This result
seems particularly arbitrary and unfair in those cases where a party is desig-
nated as plaintiff simply because he or she "won the race to the court-
house." 7 7
In some situations it is possible that a court could more easily calculate a
defendant's cost in complying with a court order than it could the value of
the plaintiffs' rights. In McCarty, the plaintiffs' monetary interest may have
been the appraised value of the disputed easement or the value of the use of
the land free of the obstructing pipeline. Given that the McCartys were
74. See 1 J. MooRE FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.91[1], at 846 (2d ed. Supp. 1979). The author
posits the following example. If plaintiff seeks an injunction to have defendant remove an office
building encroaching on one foot of the plaintiff's land, the value of the matter in controversy to
plaintiff may be trivial, while the expense in removal to the defendant if the injunction is
granted would be clearly in excess of $10,000. In such a case the courts should recognize that a
substantial controversy is involved and look to the effect of the suit on either party to the
litigation.
75. Dobie, supra note 19, at 736. Dean Dobie is generally considered to be the author of
the term "plaintiff viewpoint rule." He argues for adherence to the rule because such a rigid,
simple test will result in more efficient adjudication of jurisdictional amount issues.
76. 595 F.2d at 395.
77. Comment, Federal Jurisdictional Amount: Determination of the Matter in Controversy,
73 HARV. L. Riov. 1369, 1373 (1960). In this article, the author argues that adherence to the
plaintiff viewpoint rule is unfair, and may provoke races to the courthouse in those suits in
which either party might have initiated the proceedings. See also D. CURRIE, FEDERAL
COURTS: CASES & MATERIALS, 434-35 (1968). Professor Currie responds to Dean Dobie's ar-
gument by asking: "Is this test [plaintiff viewpoint rule] consistent with the purpose of the
requirement? Does it make sense in a day when the declaratory-judgment action often makes it
only happenstance which party is the plaintiff?" Id.
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appealing, in a separate state court action, the appraisal award for this par-
ticular property, these amounts would have been relatively difficult to as-
sess. 78 In contrast, Amoco's costs in complying with an order enjoining the
pipeline were readily calculable because the obvious result of a court order
would be a $35,000 loss of investment, with the additional expense of physi-
cally removing the pipeline. 79 Thus, the either viewpoint rule applied in
McCarty proved to be a more efficient administrative procedure.
In addition, strict adherence to the plaintiff viewpoint rule in suits for
injunctive relief forces a defendant who has removed a case from state to
federal court to argue that the value of the plaintiff's right is sufficiently high
to satisfy the statutory requirement. 80 This is an unreasonable and un-
necessary burden to place on a litigant, particularly in a situation in which
the jurisdictional amount question could have been easily answered by con-
sidering the defendant's view. Under the either viewpoint rule, this situation
can be avoided.
Finally, utilizing the either viewpoint rule is consistent with the require-
ments of the jurisdictional amount statute. Section 1332 of the Judicial Code
does not distinguish between the plaintiff's view and the defendant's view; 8 1
it merely requires that the matter in controversy itself be of a value exceed-
ing $10,000.82 The McCarty court, by extending the determination of the
existence of requisite jurisdictional amount to encompass the defendant's
view as well as the plaintiff's, is thus equipped with all the information
necessary to render a fair decision.
Although the McCarty court did not discuss the application of the either
viewpoint rule beyond the specific fact situation of a plaintiff seeking to re-
move an obstruction from his or her property, it would be incorrect to as-
sume that the rule is merely an exception limited to this case. The principle
78. See note 50 supra.
79. 595 F.2d at 395. See note 8 supra.
80. Upon removal to federal court, a defendant assumes the burden of proving jurisdictional
facts. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Hatridge v.
Aetna Cas. & Stir. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1969). This becomes a difficult task under
the plaintiff viewpoint rule. In the McCarty case, for example, the defendant argued alterna-
tively that the value to the plaintiffs of the disputed easement exceeded $10,000 by including
the intangible value of the rights the plaintiff was suing to protect. Brief for Appellee at 11,
McCartv v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1979). Obviously this would be specu-
lation on the defendant's part. On the other hand, by utilizing the either viewpoint rule, the
defendant was able to prove the existence of the jurisdictional amount by an aflidavit. See note
8 supra.
81. See note 2 supra.
82. The purpose of the minimum amount requirement is to set a standard that is "not so
high as to convert the Federal courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away.
their time in the trial of petty controversies." S. REP. No. 1930, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 351 (1961); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v.
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1937). See also Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Cam-
paign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973). The court stated: "Where the case is
worth at least $10,000 to the defendant, the requirement is satisfied just as fully as where a
plaintiff can demonstrate the $10,000 value or sum." Id. at 60.
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of construing section 1332 fairly to allow a defendant's view to be considered
in determining jurisdictional amount theoretically is applicable in any suit for
injunctive or declaratory relief brought by a single plaintiff, or a group of
plaintiffs asserting a single and undivided claim. 83 The either viewpoint
rule has, for example, been applied in other circuits in suits to compel
specific performance of a contract, 84 to enjoin violations of state sales regula-
tions, 85 and in suits by creditors to compel payments. 86
IMPACT
The basic procedures employed by courts to determine the value of the
matter in controversy in suits for injunctive relief are not altered by the
adoption of the either viewpoint rule. The courts will continue to look
primarily to the plaintiffs' complaint to determine what remedy the plaintiff
seeks. The jurisdictional amount requirement can then be satisfied by a find-
ing that either the value of the plaintiff's rights which have been interfered
with, or, the foreseeable pecuniary burden the defendant might bear in
complying with the plaintiff's remedy, exceeds the statutory minimum. The
rule prohibiting the plaintiff from using collateral effects, such as the impact
of a court's decision by stare decisis or estoppel, to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount requirement should also apply to the defendant. 87 Under the
either viewpoint rule, only the direct costs of complying with the relief re-
quested by the plaintiff may be considered by an examining court. 88
The use of the either viewpoint rule should not substantially increase the
number of cases brought into federal courts. 89 Although the Supreme
Court has stated that suits involving issues of state law, and brought into
federal court solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, might be tried more
appropriately in state court, 90 this is not a persuasive argument for the re-
83. See note 99 and accompanying text infra.
84. Ridder Bros. Inc. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944).
85. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 605 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir.
1979).
86. Miller v. First Serv. Corp., 84 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1936). In Miller, the either viewpoint
analysis was applied although the court found that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant could
establish the requisite sum.
87. See, e.g., Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934). In this action to enjoin the enforcement
of a state licensing requirement, the Court ruled that "the collateral effect of the decree, by
virtue of stare decisis, upon other and distinct controversies may not be considered in ascertain-
ing whether the jurisdictional amount is involved .. ." Id. at 267. See also Mayor of Baltimore
v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 62 F. 500 (D. Md. 1894), aff'd, 156 U.S. 210 (1895); Bruce v. Man-
chester & Keene R.R., 117 U.S. 514 (1888); Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U.S. 578 (1882).
88. McCarty v: Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1979).
89. 1 J. Moomu FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.90[4], at 835 (2d ed. 1979). Professor Moore doubts
that even without a minimum jurisdictional amount requirement the courts will be flooded with
cases. By way of example he notes the experience under the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, ch. 26, § 205(e), 56 Stat. 34 (1942). No evidence ever surfaced that petty claims flooded
the courts, even though no minimum amount requirement was specified.
90. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).
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tention of the plaintiff viewpoint rule. Whatever small benefit the plaintiff
viewpoint rule may provide in limiting the workload of the courts is out-
weighed by the unfairness of denying litigants with substantial pecuniary
interests in a given case their opportunity to present it before a federal
forum.
There is one area of the law in which the application of the either view-
point rule has been restricted by the courts. The Supreme Court's recent
restrictions on aggregation of claims in class action suits are, at least accord-
ing to one court, applications of the plaintiff viewpoint rule. 91  In Snyder v.
Harris, 92 a shareholder in an insurance company brought a class action suit
against the firm to require it to distribute an excess profit 'among its sub-
scribers. Although the plaintiff sought less than $10,000, she contended that
the aggregate of all the claims of the class satisfied the jurisdictional amount
requirement. 93 The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the plaintiffs
could not aggregate claims to fulfill the statutory requirement. 94 The Court
explained its restrictive decision, at least partially, on the grounds that the
amount in controversy requirement existed to check the rising case load in
the federal courts. 95
The Supreme Court expanded the rule of Snyder in Zahn v. International
Paper Co. 96 In that case, a number of property owners brought a class
action suit against a paper company for damage allegedly caused by the dis-
charge of wastes. 97 The Court ruled in Zahn that each member of the
plaintiff class must individually sustain damages in excess of $10,000 to be
included in the case.98
Recent attempts to overcome the Snyder and Zahn doctrines in class ac-
tion suits requesting monetary and injunctive relief by the use of the either
viewpoint rule have proved futile. 99 It has been asserted in some recent
91. Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1977). In Snow, the court stated: "'[it
is clear that the [Supreme] Court applied the plaintiff's viewpoint rule-at least for a Rule 23
(b) class action not involving a request for injunctive relief." Id. at 789.
92. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
93. Id. at 333.
94. Id. at 337.
95. Id. at 340.
96. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
97. 1d. at 292.
98. Id. at 295.
99. Lonuquist v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1970); Massachusetts State
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Federal Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1970). In
Lonnquist, four state court class actions were removed by the defendants to federal court. The
complaints sought refunds and an order enjoining the defendant from charging an allegedly
usurious interest rate. The court held that it would be improper to consider the total detriment
to the defendant for the purpose of satisfying jurisdictional amount because the claims were
separate and distinct and, as such, could not be aggregated. In Massachusetts, a diversity class
action was brought originally in federal court seeking to enjoin alleged illegal competition. The
court denied jurisdiction holding that the plaintiff's viewpoint rule is the only valid rule. But
see Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969). In Berman, a class
action brought against the defendant involved a common and undivided right. Because such
claims are permissibly aggregated, the court was able to consider the total detriment to the
defendant to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.
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cases that in class action suits requesting injunctive relief, the Snyder and
Zahn restrictions on the aggregation of the plaintiffs' claims could be avoided
by looking to the monetary impact the injunction might have on the defend-
ant. This argument is not without merit because the defendant will be af-
fected, in some cases, by an order compelling the defendant to bear a sub-
stantial financial burden that is quite separate from the damages request. 100
In Snow v. Ford Motor Company, 101 for example, the plaintiff filed a class
action suit requesting $11 damages and a court order enjoining Ford from
selling a defective product. Two competing lines of authority were jux-
taposed. Because the Ninth Circuit had previously adopted the either view-
point rule in suits for injunctive relief, 102 the court could look to Ford's cost
in complying with an injunction to satisfy the jurisdictional amount require-
ment. 103 The Zahn doctrine, however, precluded the court of appeals from
extending jurisdiction because each plaintiff in Snow claimed only $11 dam-
ages. The court refused jurisdiction, and ruled that applying the either
viewpoint rule to a mixed remedy suit would evade the barriers set forth in
Snyder and Zahn. 104
This is the only area of law, however, in which courts that have adopted
the either viewpoint rule have consistently restricted its application. Because
the Snyder and Zahn doctrines are applicable only in class action suits, the
either viewpoint rule is appropriate in non-class suits for injunctive or de-
claratory relief.
CONCLUSION
The McCarty court correctly recognized that the interests of fairness and
common sense require the rejection of the plaintiff viewpoint rule. By adopt-
ing the either viewpoint rule, the court avoided the arbitrary results that
often arise from strict adherence to the plaintiff viewpoint rule. The court
could also more accurately determine the true magnitude of the matter in
controversy in complete compliance with the requirements of the jurisdic-
tional amount statute. By utilizing the either viewpoint rule in future
Seventh Circuit cases, the determii-ation of the value of the matter in con-
troversy will become a more logical, efficient, and fair procedure.
The McCarty decision should be required reading for any court facing the
important but far too often misunderstood question of viewpoint analysis. In
order to apply the jurisdictional amount requirement realistically in these
cases, courts should be willing to exalt substance, by applying the either
viewpoint rule, over the procedural form of the plaintiff viewpoint rule.
William Stone Schober
100. See Moore & Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction: A Proposal to Simplify the System to Meet
the Needs of a Complex Society, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1973); Comment, Closing the Court-
house Door: The Aftermath of Snyder v. Harris, 68 Nw. L. REV. 1011, 1015-19 (1974).
101. 561 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1977).
102. Ridder Bros. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944).
103. 561 F,2d at 789.
104. Id. at 791.
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